Contents

Working notes

What is your objective function

Before life emerges, there is zero hedonic potential to be extracted from the existence of a human being. Once that life ends, it goes again to zero. This implies that during a person's lifetime, if we assume that life is a game, the function that should be maximised is the extraction of pleasure. We then need a trade-off between what is pleasure and what is gratification.


In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is.

Benjamin Brewster1

Theory

The kinds of ethics

Ethics is usually divided by the kind of question asked. Descriptive ethics asks what people in fact value and do. Normative ethics asks what a person should value and do. Applied ethics asks what should be done in a particular case, and metaethics asks whether there is a right answer at all, and what would make it right.

Almost every ism below is a normative theory, a candidate for what a life should aim at. Hedonism, egoism and altruism also have descriptive versions, which say what people do seek, and the two are easy to confuse: that people chase pleasure does not show that pleasure is what they should maximise. Applied ethics is where a chosen theory meets a real decision. Metaethics is where existentialism and nihilism belong, since they ask whether any answer is correct or only chosen.

The isms

Each position below is one answer to the question of what a life should aim at. They are taken in the order of what they disagree about: what is good, whose good counts, whether outcomes settle the matter, and whether there is an answer at all.

Hedonism holds that pleasure is the only thing good in itself and pain the only thing bad in itself2. It began in ancient Greece with Aristippus of Cyrene and the Cyrenaics in the 4th century BCE, who prized the pleasure of the moment3. The standard objection is the experience machine: if pleasure were all that mattered, a life plugged into a machine that supplied it would be the best life4, ch. 3.

Epicureanism is a restrained form of hedonism: the best life is one of tranquillity and freedom from pain, reached by wanting less5. Epicurus taught it in Athens from about 307 BCE6, and it bears directly on the split between pleasure and gratification in the notes above.

Virtue ethics, also called eudaimonism, asks what kind of person to be. Its aim is eudaimonia, a flourishing life reached through good character7. It comes from Aristotle in Athens in the 4th century BCE8 and was revived in the 20th century9, 10.

Stoicism holds that virtue is the only good, that health, wealth and pleasure are indifferent, and that peace comes from attending only to what is in a person's control11. It was founded by Zeno of Citium in Athens about 300 BCE and carried forward in Rome by Seneca, Epictetus12 and Marcus Aurelius13.

Egoism comes in two forms. The descriptive form says every act is ultimately motivated by self-interest14; the normative form says each person ought to pursue their own good15. The descriptive form is usually traced to Hobbes16, with the classic reply from Butler17. The normative form was defended by Stirner18 and later by Rand19, and Sidgwick treated it as one of the three serious methods of ethics20.

Altruism is acting for the good of another person for that person's sake21. The word was coined in France as the opposite of egoism, with the rule to live for others22. Whether pure altruism exists is an empirical question23, and its modern applied form, effective altruism, grows out of an essay by Singer24.

Utilitarianism holds that the right act is the one that produces the greatest total wellbeing, with every person counted equally. It arose in Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries. The formula of the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers appears in Hutcheson25; Bentham built the system26, Mill refined it27, and Sidgwick gave it its most careful form20. Driver traces the history28.

Consequentialism is the family to which utilitarianism and ethical egoism belong: an act is right or wrong solely because of its outcomes29. The idea is old, and the name comes from Anscombe, who used it as a criticism9.

Deontology holds that some acts are required or forbidden in themselves, whatever their outcomes, so that duty comes before results30. Its source is Kant in 18th-century Prussia: act only on a rule that could be willed for everyone, and treat persons always as ends31.

Contractualism holds that right acts are those permitted by rules people could agree to, or justify to one another32. The social contract goes back to Hobbes16, and the modern forms are those of Rawls33 and Scanlon34.

Existentialism holds that no purpose is given in advance, and that each person chooses their own and is responsible for the choice35. It begins with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the 19th century and has its best-known statements in 1940s France36, 37.

Nihilism holds that there are no objective values, so no objective function is correct. Nietzsche diagnosed it in the 1880s as the consequence of losing religious foundations38, and its modern philosophical form is the error theory39, 40.

Negative utilitarianism makes the aim the reduction of suffering, with added happiness counting for less or for nothing. It was proposed by Popper41 and named by Smart42.

Antinatalism holds that coming into existence is a harm, so creating new people is wrong43. Its main modern statement is by Benatar, building on Schopenhauer44. It starts from the same observation as the notes above, that nobody is deprived of pleasure before they exist, and reaches a different conclusion.

Satisficing stands outside the isms. It is the observation that real agents search until an option is good enough and then stop45, which questions whether a life has an objective function to maximise at all.

Practice

Theory asks what a person should optimise for. Practice asks what people turn out to have wanted once the time to optimise is nearly over. The closest evidence comes from people who are dying and from older people looking back.

In a national survey in the United States, 340 seriously ill patients were asked what mattered at the end of life, alongside bereaved relatives, physicians and other carers. All four groups put pain control, preparation for death and a sense of completion near the top. Freedom from pain ranked first, and patients cared more than their physicians about staying mentally aware46. When about 100 terminally ill patients in Canada and Australia were asked to record what had mattered most in their lives, 76% reported a heightened sense of dignity, 68% more purpose and 67% more meaning, and 81% said the record would help their family47. Among 153 hospice patients, regret about the life lived was related to how they faced death and to their emotional health48. The dying are also less bleak than the healthy expect. The blogs of about 600 terminally ill people were more positive than the writing of healthy people asked to imagine dying, and they grew more positive as death approached49.

Regret has been measured more carefully in ordinary adults. In the short run people regret what they did; in the long run they regret what they did not do50. Lasting regrets are mostly about the person one hoped to become and less about duties left undone, by 72% to 28% across six studies51. Time itself changes the aim. When time feels open-ended, people pursue knowledge and future pay-offs; when it feels short, they turn to emotionally meaningful goals and close relationships52.

Asked in their own words what makes life meaningful, adults in 14 of 17 advanced economies named family first, with work and material wellbeing usually next53. The longest study of adult life, which has followed 724 men since 1938 and later their families, found that the quality of close relationships predicted later health and happiness: those most satisfied in their relationships at 50 were the healthiest at 8054. Feeling good and finding life worthwhile also come apart. In a survey of 397 adults, health, money and ease went with happiness and not with meaning, while worry, effort and giving to others went with meaning55. That gap is the split between pleasure and gratification in the notes, under another name.

The claim that money stops mattering past a certain income has been tested, revised and partly withdrawn. An analysis of more than 450,000 survey responses in the United States found that day-to-day emotional wellbeing rose with income up to about $75,000 a year and then flattened, while satisfaction with life as a whole kept rising56. Worldwide data put the point of satiation near $95,000 for life satisfaction57. A later study that sampled people's feelings in the moment found no plateau at all58. The two sides then reanalysed the data together and found both partly right: the plateau exists, at about $100,000, for the unhappiest minority, roughly the bottom 15 to 20%, and for everyone else happiness keeps rising with income59. Income works on a log scale, so the step from $100,000 to $200,000 feels like the step from $25,000 to $50,000. Money removes misery more reliably than it adds joy.

What is remembered differs from what was felt. Patients who rated their pain during a medical procedure and again afterwards remembered the worst moment and the final moments, and ignored how long the pain had lasted60. There are therefore two candidates for the thing being maximised: the life as it is felt moment by moment, and the life as it is remembered and judged. A deathbed report is the second kind.

This evidence has limits. The best-known list, the five regrets of the dying, comes from one palliative carer's recollections and has no sample, method or count61. Careful studies of dying people's own regrets are few, and most end-of-life research measures what patients want from care. The regret studies mostly sample Americans, and the two percentages on regret come from the university's summary of the paper. The long study of adult life began with men in one American city. The income figures are in dollars of their survey years, so $75,000 in 2010 is well over $100,000 today.

Set against the theory, the practice points in a consistent direction. Nobody in these studies reports wishing for more pleasure as such. Freedom from pain ranks first, which is the negative-utilitarian and Epicurean half of hedonism. Beyond that, people name completion, meaning, dignity and other people, which sit closer to virtue ethics than to hedonism. Money behaves like pain relief: it lifts the floor and does little for those whose unhappiness has other causes. The theory also treats the objective function as fixed, and the evidence on time suggests that it changes as the time left shrinks52.

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